to
the execution of his commission?

It would answer the same end that the nominal power which is vested in the
different states answers, that is, it would answer the end of paying for
the support of a shaddow, without reaping the benefit of the substance.

It is certainly requisite that proper powers should be vested in an
executive (and certainly no more than necessary powers are vested in the
executive of the United States by the new constitution) or else the
establishment of such a branch is needless.

Section 4, of article II. says, The president, vice-president, and all
civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors.--Thus we see that no office, however exalted, can protect
the miscreant, who dares invade the liberties of his country, or
countenance in his crimes the impious villain who sacrilegiously attempts
to trample upon the rights of freemen.

Who will be absurd enough to affirm, that the section alluded to, does not
sufficiently prove that the federal convention have formed a government
which provides that we shall be ruled by laws and not by men? None,
surely, but an anti-federalist--and from them falsehood receives constant
homage; for it is on the basis of falsehood and the summit of ignorance,
that all opposition to the federal government is founded.

Section 1, of article III. provides, That the judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferiour courts
as Congress may from time to time appoint.--It has been asserted, that a
federal court would be an engine of partiality in the government, a source
of oppression and injustice to the poorer part of the community; but how
far consistency influenced the conduct of the authors of such assertions,
the publick must determine. The anti-federalists have said, that if a
cause should come before one of state judicial courts, and judgment be
given against the person who possessed most interest, that he would
immediately appeal to the federal court, whose residence would be at the
seat of government, and consequently at so great a distance that an
inhabitant of the state of Georgia or New-Hampshire, if he was in low
circumstances, would not be able to carry his cause before the federal
court, and would, therefore, be obliged to give it up to his wealthier
antagonist. The glaring improbability with which su