tum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that
the discussions should take place in London with the
participation of the Great Powers.

M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume
the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe
would be thankful to them. It would be very important that
Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her
military action on Servian territory.[77]

[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]

_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by
some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place
some time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St.
Petersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that
while Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the
substance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to suspend military
preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession
of its chief value.[78]

[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]

The cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at
present writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria
publishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.

Two theories are equally plausible:

Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to
champion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified
reversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at
Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that
event, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more
iniquitous.[79]

[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]

The supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised
from Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve
the peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war
inevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world
would be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the
attitude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more
plausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not
Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the
conflict.

_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that
Austria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that
a ray of light had broken through the l