nd as of right the cooperation of Italy, while
France, determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor,
had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused
to take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of
the ultimatum.

The confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George suggests
the possibility that on August the 1st, about the time that the
eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready and intended to
commence an immediate invasion of France, for on that day the Kaiser
telegraphs to King George:

"_I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on
my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and
telephone from crossing into France._" (_Ante_, p. 187.)

The exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message is
conjectural. We know from the German _White Paper_ that at 11 A.M.
on that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince Lichnowsky over the
telephone whether Germany was "in a position to declare that we would
not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France
should remain neutral."

This message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. How soon
thereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not know, but as the
impossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in Berlin on
receipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 P.M. on that day, it is
altogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent between those
hours.

If the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural
import is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the
invasion of France, either before or in any event simultaneously with
the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been determined
upon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the Kaiser's intimation
that he has "stopped by telegraph and telephone [his army] from
crossing into France" fairly implies that previous orders had been
given to commence such invasion and that these orders had been
hurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way, upon the supposed
intimation of Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the
neutrality of France.

Under these circumstances, with the German Ambassador still at Paris
and ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is evident that the
invasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the
severance of diplomatic relations. This in itself may not be
indefensible under international law, but it