ls
us that they are the "salt of the earth," and "among the greatest
thinkers, moralists, and philanthropists of the age." To overbear the
doubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this
defense has the support of the great theologian, Harnack, the sound
and accomplished political scientist and economist, von Schmoller, the
distinguished philologian, von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian,
Lamprecht, the profound statesman, von Posadowsky, the brilliant
diplomatist, von Buelow, the great financier, von Gwinner, the great
promoter of trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, Siemens,
the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, Dryander, and the indispensable
Director in the Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives are
those of Professor Burgess.)

The average American, as indeed the average citizen of any country,
when his natural passions are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a
very prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, and when he has
reached his conclusion based upon everyday, commonplace morality, he
is not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names, fortified
by an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy
of brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often best grasped by the
democracy of common sense.

The defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems
to be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that "England and
France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium."

They say:

It would have been a crime against the German people if the
German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The
inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual,
whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to
resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times
of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a
friendly neutrality, which would permit the unobstructed
passage of German troops through small portions of her
territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German
General Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to
avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most
unfavorable ground.

In other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that
it should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason
Belgium must be ruined.

Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abh