Scott, F.R.S.:
That, upon the 22nd of March, 1870, at Lat. 5 deg. 47' N., Long. 27 deg. 52' W.,
the sailors of the _Lady of the Lake_ saw a remarkable object, or
"cloud," in the sky. They reported to the captain.
According to Capt. Banner, it was a cloud of circular form, with an
included semi-circle divided into four parts, the central dividing shaft
beginning at the center of the circle and extending far outward, and
then curving backward.
Geometricity and complexity and stability of form: and the small
likelihood of a cloud maintaining such diversity of features, to say
nothing of appearance of organic form.
The thing traveled from a point at about 20 degrees above the horizon to
a point about 80 degrees above. Then it settled down to the northeast,
having appeared from the south, southeast.
Light gray in color, or it was cloud-color.
"It was much lower than the other clouds."
And this datum stands out:
That, whatever it may have been, it traveled against the wind.
"It came up obliquely against the wind, and finally settled down right
in the wind's eye."
For half an hour this form was visible. When it did finally disappear
that was not because it disintegrated like a cloud, but because it was
lost to sight in the evening darkness.
Capt. Banner draws the following diagram:
[Illustration]
23
Text-books tell us that the Dhurmsalla meteorites were picked up "soon,"
or "within half an hour." Given a little time the conventionalists may
argue that these stones were hot when they fell, but that their great
interior coldness had overcome the molten state of their surfaces.
According to the Deputy Commissioner of Dhurmsalla, these stones had
been picked up "immediately" by passing coolies.
These stones were so cold that they benumbed the fingers. But they had
fallen with a great light. It is described as "a flame of fire about
two feet in depth and nine feet in length." Acceptably this light was
not the light of molten matter.
In this chapter we are very intermediatistic--and unsatisfactory. To the
intermediatist there is but one answer to all questions:
Sometimes and sometimes not.
Another form of this intermediatist "solution" of all problems is:
Yes and no.
Everything that is, also isn't.
A positivist attempts to formulate: so does the intermediatist, but with
less rigorousness: he accepts but also denies: he may seem to accept in
one respect and deny in some othe
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