terms, Justice Harlan contends that the sweeping declaration that
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist would by
implication confer the power. He also shows conclusively that,
under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the right by appropriate
legislation to protect the colored people against the deprivation
of any right on account of their race, and that Congress is not
necessarily restricted, under the Thirteenth Amendment, to legislation
against slavery as an institution, but that power may be exerted
to the extent of protecting the race from discrimination in respect
to such rights as belong to freemen, where such discrimination is
based on race or color.

If Justice Harlan is wrong the amendments are left without force
and Congress without power. No purpose can be assigned for their
adoption. No object can be guessed that was to be accomplished.
They become words, so arranged that they sound like sense, but when
examined fall meaninglessly apart. Under the decision of the
Supreme Court they are Quaker cannon--cloud forts--"property" for
political stage scenery--coats of mail made of bronzed paper--
shields of gilded pasteboard--swords of lath.

_Question_. Do you wish to say anything as to the reasoning of
Justice Harlan on the rights of colored people on railways, in inns
and theatres?

_Answer_. Yes, I do. That part of the opinion is especially
strong. He shows conclusively that a common carrier is in the
exercise of a sort of public office and has public duties to perform,
and that he cannot exonerate himself from the performance of these
duties without the consent of the parties concerned. He also shows
that railroads are public highways, and that the railway company
is the agent of the State, and that a railway, although built by
private capital, is just as public in its nature as though constructed
by the State itself. He shows that the railway is devoted to public
use, and subject to be controlled by the State for the public
benefit, and that for these reasons the colored man has the same
rights upon the railway that he has upon the public highway.

Justice Harlan shows that the same law is applicable to inns that
is applicable to railways; that an inn-keeper is bound to take all
travelers if he can accommodate them; that he is not to select his
guests; that he has not right to say to one "you may come in," and
to another "you shall not;" that every one who conducts himself