ose, in itself an indication
of a powerful will, had distinguished Jackson from his very boyhood.
During his campaigns he would pace for hours outside his tent, his
hands clasped behind his back, absorbed in meditation; and when the
army was on the march, he would ride for hours without raising his
eyes or opening his lips. It was unquestionably at such moments that
he was working out his plans, step by step, forecasting the
counter-movements of the enemy, and providing for every emergency
that might occur. And here the habit of keeping his whole faculties
fixed on a single object, and of imprinting on his memory the
successive processes of complicated problems, fostered by the methods
of study which, both at West Point and Lexington, the weakness of his
eyes had made compulsory, must have been an inestimable advantage.
Brilliant strategical manoeuvres, it cannot be too often repeated,
are not a matter of inspiration and of decision on the spur of the
moment. The problems presented by a theatre of war, with their many
factors, are not to be solved except by a vigorous and sustained
intellectual effort. "If," said Napoleon, "I always appear prepared,
it is because, before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated
for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which
reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances
unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation."

The proper objective, speaking in general terms, of all military
operations is the main army of the enemy, for a campaign can never be
brought to a successful conclusion until the hostile forces in the
field have become demoralised by defeat; but, to ensure success,
preponderance of numbers is usually essential, and it may be said,
therefore, that the proper objective is the enemy's main army when it
is in inferior strength.

Under ordinary conditions, the first step, then, towards victory must
be a movement, or a series of movements, which will compel the enemy
to divide his forces, and put it out of his power to assemble even
equal strength on the battle-field.

This entails a consideration of the strategic points upon the theatre
of war, for it is by occupying or threatening some point which the
enemy cannot afford to lose that he will be induced to disperse his
army, or to place himself in a position where he can be attacked at a
disadvantage. While his main army, therefore, is the ultimate
objective, certain strat