discovered a weak point could
suddenly throw the greater portion of his force against it. Hooker
could only hope that no weak point existed. Remembering that the
Confederates were on the pike and the plank road, there certainly
appeared no cause for apprehension. The Fifth Corps, with its flank
on the Rappahannock, held the left, covering the river and the old
Mine roads. Next in succession came the Second Corps, blocking the
pike. In the centre the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum, covered
Chancellorsville. The Third Corps, under Sickles, held Hazel Grove,
with Berry's division as general reserve; and on the extreme right,
his breastworks running along the plank road as far as Talley's
Clearing, was Howard with the Eleventh Corps, composed principally of
German regiments. Strong outposts of infantry had been thrown out
into the woods; the men were still working in the intrenchments;
batteries were disposed so as to sweep every approach from the south,
the south-east, or the south-west, and there were at least five men
to every yard of parapet. The line, however, six miles from flank to
flank, was somewhat extensive, and to make certain, so far as
possible, that sufficient numbers should be forthcoming to defend the
position, at 1.55 on the morning of May 2, Sedgwick was instructed to
send the First Army Corps to Chancellorsville. Before midnight,
moreover, thirty-four guns, principally horse. Artillery, together
with a brigade of infantry, were sent from Falmouth to Banks' Ford.

Sedgwick, meantime, below Fredericksburg, had contented himself with
engaging the outposts on the opposite ridge. An order to make a brisk
demonstration, which Hooker had dispatched at 11.30 A.M., did not
arrive, the telegraph having broken down, until 5.45 P.M., six hours
later; and it was then too late to effect any diversion in favour of
the main army.

Yet it can hardly be said that Sedgwick had risen to the height of
his responsibilities. He knew that a portion at least of the
Confederates had marched against Hooker, and the balloonists had
early reported that a battle was in progress near Tabernacle Church.
But instead of obeying Napoleon's maxim and marching to the sound of
the cannon, he had made no effort to send support to his commander.
Both he and General Reynolds* (* The following letter (O.R. volume 25
page 337) is interesting as showing the state of mind into which the
commanders of detached forces are liable to be thrown b