elf in vain against a stone wall and a few
gun-pits, and it is little wonder that he had imbibed a profound
respect for defensive tactics. He omitted, however, to take into
consideration two simple facts. First, that few districts contain two
such positions as those of the Confederates at Fredericksburg; and,
secondly, that the strength of a position is measured not by the
impregnability of the front, but by the security of the flanks. The
Fredericksburg lines, resting on the Rappahannock and the Massaponax,
had apparently safe flanks, and yet he himself had completely turned
them, rendering the whole series of works useless without firing a
shot. Were Lee and Jackson the men to knock their heads, like
Burnside, against stout breastworks strongly manned? Would they not
rather make a wide sweep, exactly as he himself had done, and force
him to come out of his works? Hooker, however, may have said that if
they marched across his front, he would attack them en route, as did
Napoleon at Austerlitz and Wellington at Salamanca, and cut their
army in two. But here he came face to face with the fatal defect of
the lines he had selected, and also of the disposition he had made of
his cavalry. The country near Chancellorsville was very unlike the
rolling plains of Austerlitz or the bare downs of Salamanca. From no
part of the Federal position did the view extend for more than a few
hundred yards. Wherever the eye turned rose the dark and impenetrable
screen of close-growing trees, interlaced with wild vines and matted
undergrowth, and seamed with rough roads, perfectly passable for
troops, with which his enemies were far better acquainted than
himself. Had Stoneman's cavalry been present, the squadrons, posted
far out upon the flanks, and watching every track, might have given
ample warning of any turning movement, exactly as Stuart's cavalry
had given Lee warning of Hooker's own movement upon Chancellorsville.
As it was, Pleasonton's brigade was too weak to make head against
Stuart's regiments; and Hooker could expect no early information of
his enemy's movements.

He thus found himself in the dilemma which a general on the
defensive, if he be weak in cavalry, has almost invariably to face,
especially in a close country. He was ignorant, and must necessarily
remain ignorant, of where the main attack would be made. Lee, on the
other hand, by means of his superior cavalry, could reconnoitre the
position at his leisure, and if he