n the best position to interpret
the enemy's probable intentions.

During my stay at Compiegne all appreciations of the situation pointed
to the immediate investment of Paris by the right wing of the German
Army as being the enemy's first objective.

It is fairly certain that the concentration of an important new Army
on the western flank of the British, to the north of Paris, was quite
unknown to the Germans, and did not enter into their calculations
until some days later.

We had also the best reason for believing that the German
Higher Command regarded the British Forces as shattered and almost
useless, at any rate so far as any effort which we could make for the
defence of Paris was concerned. In fact, believing the capital to be
practically at its mercy, the right wing of the German Army was
blindly marching into a veritable hornet's nest, in spite of the
backward condition of the Paris defence.

On the 29th a very brilliant and successful attack by the French 5th
Army at Guise heavily defeated three German Army Corps and threw them
back with severe loss. This had a great effect in assisting the
retreat, for it not only enabled the 5th Army to hold its own for some
time on the Oise, between Guise and La Fere, but it considerably
relieved hostile pressure on the British and on the French troops on
our left.

From Roye on the west, Montdidier, Noyon, La Fere, Guise, up to Hirson
on the east, the heads of the Allied columns were established, well
covered by their advanced cavalry.

Throughout this day reports often contradictory and conflicting
reached me. It was quite clear that our position on the Oise was being
dangerously threatened by superior forces, and I felt it to be
impossible to stand on that line even until we could make good some of
our heavy losses, and I could not hope to get anything up for several
days to come.

With great reluctance I ordered the retreat to be continued to the
line of the Aisne from Compiegne to Soissons, but in view of the knock
given to the enemy at Guise by the 5th French Army, and the desire
expressed by General Joffre that the Allied forces should hold their
ground as long as possible and only retire when necessary, I
directed commanders to carry out their marches with all deliberation,
and to take advantage of every opportunity to check the enemy's
advance.

It now became known to the Allied Command that the enemy had detached
a considerable force to his eastern fro