ere not in a wide enough formation, and perhaps in some cases the
field artillery were not pushed far enough forward. I called attention
to these points in the following Memorandum, which was issued on the
10th:--

"The latest experiences have shown that the enemy never neglects an
opportunity to use all his available artillery in forward positions
under cover of cavalry and other mobile troops.

"Our cavalry is now organised in two Divisions, the first of three,
the second of two Brigades, each with a Brigade of Horse
Artillery. During the present phase of the operations--which consist
of as rapid a pursuit and pressure of the enemy as possible in his
retreat--two Corps will generally be in first line. A Cavalry Division
will be directed to work on the front and flank of either Corps and
well in advance. The Commander of the cavalry will remain in the
closest concert with the Corps Commanders on the flank on which he is
working.

"The Corps Commanders will send forward with the cavalry as much of
their field artillery as can be usefully employed in harassing the
enemy's retirement. They will place them under the direction of the
Cavalry Commander for the day, the latter officer being responsible
for their safety.

"When, owing to the approach of darkness, the field artillery can no
longer find useful targets, they will be withdrawn from the cavalry
back to the Division to which they belong. Should the enemy make any
decided stand during such operations and a general action arise or
become imminent, the field artillery in the front will either fall
back or retain their position, at the discretion of the Corps
Commander, and again come under their Divisional Commander.

"The withdrawal from under the supervision of the Cavalry Commander
will always remain at the discretion of the Corps Commander.

"I wish to call the attention of Corps Commanders to the necessity of
warning their infantry against what is known as 'bunching up.' Losses
and delay in overcoming rearguards resistance during the present phase
of the operations have undoubtedly been caused by this.

"Instances have also occurred when undue delay in effecting the
passage of a river has been caused by a failure to realise
the nature of the problem from the purely local standpoint.

"Small flanking parties, crossing at unguarded points by hastily
improvised means, will dislodge hostile infantry and Maxims much more
quickly and effectively than by fronta