esponse from the
combatant Powers. At the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated
the offer of American mediation.

At that time a vigorous agitation had begun in New York for the
restoration of peace. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the well-known
editor of widely circulated newspapers, and other well-known
personalities, called together great meetings at which America's
historical mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale
murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, together
with several other gentlemen, staying with James Speyer, the banker,
at his country house. The host and the majority of the guests,
among whom was the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus,
were supporters of the prevailing pacific movement. The question
of American mediation was eagerly discussed at the dinner table.
Mr. Straus was an extremely warm adherent of this idea. He turned
particularly to me because the German Government were regarded as
opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not desired the
war and would certainly be ready at the first suitable opportunity
for a peace by understanding. Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that
he would at once travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr.
Bryan. Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on the
following day I received a wire from the Secretary of State, asking
me to return to Washington as soon as I could to discuss the matter
with him. There we had a long interview in his private residence,
with the result that an American offer of mediation was sent to
the Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone to the
ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who all more or less
rejected the proposal. The friendly reply of the German Government
coincided in principle with what I had said, but added that Mr.
Bryan should first address himself to the enemy, as the further
course of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which was not
yet known. The American Government never returned to the question
and I had no reason to urge them to do so. Any importunity on our
side would have given an impression of weakness. Nevertheless this
interlude was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readiness
for negotiation with the enemy's refusal.

In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to intervene the
American Government thought it necessary to exercise more restraint.
In spite of this, however, President Wilson, before the