wards made
a name for itself, but at that time was comparatively unknown, seemed
suited for this position. When all the preparations and preliminary
agreements had been carried through, the trust companies, under
the pressure of the Morgan influence, declared that their names
must not be associated with the syndicate. Meanwhile the matter
had gone so far that withdrawal would have meant a moral surrender
which would have been dangerous for our credit. Consequently, we
had to make up our minds to negotiate the loan under the signature
of this one firm, which was naturally undesirable for the general
interest.

Looking back, I am of the opinion that we should have done better not
to consider a loan in the United States, but to remit the necessary
funds from Berlin. This had to be done later to redeem the loan,
and at a time when the rate of exchange was much more unfavorable.
When the loan was raised we had certainly no idea that it would
have to be redeemed during the war, as we had reckoned on a shorter
duration of hostilities. On the other hand there is no truth in the
statement that this loan in some way cleared the way for further
Allied loans. These loans, which were the natural result of the
great supplies of material to the Allies, would have come in any
case. We did, however, deprive ourselves by this loan of an argument
to prove the defective neutrality of the United States.

In 1916 we succeeded in getting hold of some five millions in Treasury
notes without formal loan negotiations.

Another economic question which occupied my attention was connected
with the export of German dye-stuffs to the United States. In Berlin
it was held that German dye-stuffs should be withheld from the
United States as a lever for inducing them to protest against the
English blockade, and possibly have it raised. The same point of
view was adopted with regard to other goods which were necessities
for the United States, as, for example, potassic salt, sugar beetroot
seed and other commodities. A change of view did not occur until
the spring of 1916 at my suggestion. It is my belief that the
withholding of these goods proved a serious mistake. The political
aim of bringing pressure to bear on England with a view to the raising
of the blockade was not realized. The American industry partly got over
the difficulty by obtaining dye-stuffs in other ways--importation of
German dyes from China, where they had been systematically bou