cles. The cotton industry viewed with anxiety the increased
difficulty of finding a market, and were anxious for a reopening
of that of the Central Powers.

Certainly a shipment of cotton to Germany would only have been
justified in conjunction with comprehensive other measures, particularly
purchases on the American cotton market on German account. As a
result of detailed discussion with American interested parties,
who repeatedly urged us to such a step, we forwarded proposals
to Berlin on these lines. Their general purport was that about
a million bales of cotton should be bought outright on behalf of
Germany, and that in addition options should be secured on a further
million or two million bales on the understanding that the taking up
of the options should be dependent on the possibility of shipment
to Germany. On the strength of these measures the shipment of one
big consignment should have been undertaken. The plan had sound
prospects of success. In any case there would have been no risk
worth mentioning, as, to the initiated, there was no doubt as to
the rise of prices. In view of the new bank legislation (Federal
Reserve Act), no insuperable difficulties would have stood in the
way of financing the shipment. The indirect political pressure
on the American Government and public opinion, with its reaction
on England, would have been considerable.

Unfortunately the plan was frustrated by the taking up of the matter
in America direct from Germany, without regard to the shipment
difficulty, without going into the question of the options and
without knowledge of the political or economic situation. Bremen
actually placed a contract in New York for one million bales to be
delivered in Bremen at a fixed price. It was, however, clear from
the first to anyone acquainted with the circumstances that such a
step was bound to be futile. The whole thing turned on the question
of shipping. The American Press, again under English influence, at
once pointed the finger of scorn, saying that the contract was
not meant seriously, but was merely a piece of bluff for purposes
of German propaganda.

After this had brought about the collapse of the more ambitious
plan, the shipment of a single cargo still continued to be discussed
and detailed preparations were made. The idea had, however, to be
abandoned, because the difficulties of passing off the shipment as
a purely American enterprise were practically insuperable without
the