utrality and our adoption of submarine warfare, the action of
the Washington Government might have been other than it was; had
it even raised a finger to protest against England's methods, the
latter must instantly have given way, as had so frequently happened
during the last twenty-five years, when the United States took up on
any point an attitude hostile to Britain. The contrast between this
passive attitude on the part or the President and the traditional
forward policy of America _vis-a-vis_ England, goes far to support
the contention of Wilson's detractors in Germany--that these two
countries were in league and were playing a preconcerted game.

It is impossible to convince one's political foes on any point
except by positive proof, and until the time comes when the enemy's
archives are published, such proof cannot, of course, be adduced
on this particular matter. This time is still far distant. Why
should the enemy publish their archives? They have won and have
therefore no reason to grumble at the course of events. Thus I
can at present only combat with counter-arguments the contention
that I misunderstood the true state of affairs in America. The
hypothesis of secret collusion between America and England seems
in the present case unnecessary; the attitude of public opinion
in America is in itself sufficient explanation of the situation at
the time. Sympathy for us from the very first day of the war there
was none; but had the general feeling been as strongly for us as it
actually was against us, no doubt the Government would have kicked
against the English illegalities, and enforced an embargo against
her. I still hold to my view that Mr. Wilson made a real effort to
maintain the observance of a strict neutrality; but the decisive
factor was that he found himself, as a result of his efforts, in
increasing measure in conflict with the overwhelming Germanophobe
sentiment of the people, and continually exposed to the reproach
put forward in the Eastern States that he was a pro-German.

The American public, indifferent as it was to the affairs of Europe
and entirely ignorant of its complicated problems, failed to understand
the full extent of the peril to the very existence of the German
Empire, which compelled its rulers, much against their will and
with heavy hearts, to have recourse to the invasion of Belgium.
They themselves, living in perfect security and under pleasant
conditions, had no means of realizing