ne origin. That this is at least in great part Butler's object is plain
from the slightest inspection of his work. It has seemed to many to be an
unsatisfactory mode of arguing and but a poor defence of religion; and so
much the author is willing to allow. But in the general course of his
argument a somewhat wider issue appears. He seeks to show not only that the
difficulties in the systems of natural and revealed religion have
counterparts in nature, but also that the facts of nature, far from being
adverse to the principles of religion, are a distinct ground for inferring
their probable truth. He endeavours to show that the balance of probability
is entirely in favour of the scheme of religion, that this probability is
the natural conclusion from an inspection of nature, and that, as religion
is a matter of practice, we are bound to adopt the course of action which
is even probably the right one. If, we may imagine him saying, the precepts
of religion are entirely analogous in their partial obscurity and apparent
difficulty to the ordinary course of nature disclosed to us by experience,
then it is credible that these precepts are true; not only can no
objections be drawn against them from experience, but the balance of
probability is in their favour. This mode of reasoning from what is known
of nature to the probable truth of what is contained in religion is the
celebrated method of analogy.

Although Butler's work is peculiarly one of those which ought not to be
exhibited in outline, for its strength lies in the organic completeness
with which the details are wrought into the whole argument, yet a summary
of his results will throw more light on the method than any description
can.

Keeping clearly in view his premises--the existence of God and the limited
nature of knowledge--Butler begins by inquiring into the fundamental
pre-requisite of all natural religion--the immortality of the soul.
Evidently the stress of the whole question is here. Were man not immortal,
religion would be of little value. Now, Butler does not attempt to prove
the truth of the doctrine; that proof comes from another quarter. The only
questions he asks are--Does experience forbid us to admit immortality as a
possibility? Does experience furnish any probable reason for inferring that
immortality is a fact? To the first of these a negative, to the second an
affirmative answer is returned. All the analogies of our life here lead us
to conclude th