simultaneous attacks by the Turks
from Syria and from the sea, had determined to anticipate such a
combination by going himself against the enemy on the land side,
before the weather conditions made it possible to disembark any
formidable body of men on the shores of Egypt. Starting with this
purpose in February, he had proceeded with slight resistance until the
18th of March, when his army appeared before Acre. Smith was then
lying in the roads with two ships-of-the-line. The siege which ensued
lasted for sixty-two days, so great was Bonaparte's pertinacity, and
anxiety to possess the place; and in its course Smith displayed, not
only courage and activity, which had never been doubted, but a degree
of conduct and sound judgment that few expected of him. His division
was fortunate enough to capture the French siege train, which had to
be sent by water, and he very much disturbed the enemy's coastwise
communications, besides contributing materially to the direction of
the defence, to which the Turks, though brave enough, were not
adequate. After several desperate assaults the siege was raised on the
20th of May, and Bonaparte retreated to Egypt, regaining Cairo on the
14th of June.

Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteen
ships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July,
attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimated
at from ten to thirty thousand. Smith with his ships accompanied the
expedition. The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; but
on the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fell
upon them and totally defeated them. All who had landed were either
killed, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; the
commander-in-chief being among the latter. Four weeks later, as is
already known, Bonaparte embarked for France.

It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least,
and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitable
losses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control of
Egypt. On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted by
both Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that without
reinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlled
the sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time.
After Bonaparte's departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to this
effect. His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell upon
ar