, thus placing it out of the power of that
very independent officer to leave any mistake as to actual conditions
in the mind of the French general. To the latter he said: "I have
positive orders not to consent to any capitulation with the French
troops, at least unless they lay down their arms, surrender themselves
prisoners of war, and deliver up all the ships and stores of the port
of Alexandria to the Allied Powers." Even in such case they would not
be allowed to leave Egypt until exchanged. Any persons that attempted
to return, pursuant to an arrangement with one of the Allies,
exclusive of the others, as the El-Arish Convention was, would be made
prisoners of war.
Nelson's opinions in this matter had never wavered. As rumors of what
was brewing got about, he wrote to the Earl of Elgin, on the 21st of
December, 1800: "I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte will
never permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wicked
enough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade.
We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them." "I never
would consent to one of them returning to the Continent of Europe
during the war," he tells Spencer Smith. "I wish them to _perish_ in
Egypt, and give a great lesson to the world of the justice of the
Almighty." When Elgin, thinking him still commander-in-chief, sent him
the Convention, he replied formally: "I shall forward the papers to
Lord Keith, who will answer your Excellency. But I cannot help most
sincerely regretting that ever any countenance was given to the Turks
to enter into such a treaty with the French; for I ever held it to be
impossible to permit that army to return to Europe, but as prisoners
of war, and in that case, not to France. And was I commander-in-chief,
even when the thing was done, I should have refused to ratify any
consent or approbation of Sir Sidney Smith, and have wrote to both the
Grand Vizir and the French General, the impossibility of permitting a
vanquished army to be placed by one Ally in a position to attack
another Ally." The last phrase put the facts in a nutshell, and
illustrates well Nelson's power of going straight to the root of a
matter, disregardful of confusing side-issues, of policy or timidity.
To Hamilton he wrote passionately concerning the manifold difficulties
caused to all, except the Turks and the Smiths. "If all the wise heads
had left them to God Almighty, after the bridge was broke, all wo
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