d the practice of all the virtues.' Walker as 'Virtue
founded upon reverence of the _unknown_, and expectation of rewards or
punishments; a system of divine faith and worship as opposed to other
systems.' De Bonald as 'social intercourse between man and the
_unknown_.' Rees as 'the worship or homage that is due to the _unknown_
as creator, preserver, and, with Christians, as redeemer of the world,'
Lord Brougham as 'the subject of the science called Theology:' a science
he defines as 'the knowledge and attributes of the _unknown_' which
definitions agree in making the essential principle of religion a
principle of ignorance. That they are sufficiently correct definitions
will not be disputed, and upon them the Universalist is satisfied to
rest his case. To him the worship or adoration of what is confessedly
unknown is mere superstition; and to him professors of theology are
'artists in words,' who pretend to teach what nobody has any conception
of. Now, such persons may be well-intentioned; but their wisdom is by no
means apparent. They must be wonderfully deficient of the invaluable
sense so falsely called 'common.' Idolizers of 'thingless names,' they
set at naught the admirable dictum of Locke that it is 'unphilosophic to
suppose names in books signify real entities in nature, unless we can
frame clear and distinct ideas of those entities.'

Theists of every class would do well to calmly and fully consider this
rule of philosophising, for it involves nothing less than the
destruction of belief in the supernatural. The Jupiter of Mythologic
History, the Allah of Alkoran, and the Jehovah of 'Holy Scripture,' if
entities at all, are assuredly entities that baffle human conception. To
'frame clear and distinct ideas of them' is impossible. In respect to
the attribute of _unknown ability_ all Gods are alike.

Books have been written to exhibit the difficulties of (what priests
choose to call) Infidelity, and without doubt unbelief has its
difficulties. But, according to a universally recognised rule of
philosophising, of two difficulties we are in all cases to choose the
least. From a rule so palpably just no one can reasonably depart, and
the Universalist, while freely admitting a great difficulty on his own
side, is satisfied there can be demonstrated an infinitely greater
difficulty on the side of his opponents. The Universalist labours to
convince mankind they are not warranted by the general course of Nature
in assi