they would do as Sultans they could not do as Caliphs. The very
nature of their claims to the Caliphate made them more timid. They could
not execute the reforms which they promised, without encountering the
opposition of the whole body of the Ulema, the most powerful and the
best organized force in the empire. If they could have saved their
empire by resigning the Caliphate, they might possibly have been willing
to do it; but they were made to believe that in surrendering the
Caliphate they would lose the support of the only part of the nation
upon which they could fully depend. So they hesitated, promising much
and doing little, raising hopes on one side which could never be
forgotten, and raising fears on the other which they could not allay;
seeing clearly the need of reform, but seeing no way in which to
accomplish it. They could decide upon nothing, and drifted on until
Abd-ul-Aziz was deposed and assassinated by his own ministers, and the
empire was on the verge of ruin.

The next Sultan was overwhelmed by the burdens which fell upon him, and
in a few months was deposed as a lunatic. Sultan Hamid came to the
throne under these trying circumstances, and it seemed for a time that
he might be the last of the Sultans. He was but little known, as he had
been forced to live in retirement, and it was supposed that he would
follow meekly in the steps of his predecessors; but it very soon became
evident to those about him that he had a mind and a will of his
own--more than this, that he had a policy which he was determined to
carry out. A Sultan with a fixed policy was a new thing, and to this day
Europe is somewhat sceptical about it; but it very soon became apparent
to close observers at Constantinople. Sultan Hamid was determined to be
first of all the Caliph, the Imam-ul-Mussilmin, and to sacrifice all
other interests to this. His education had been exclusively religious,
and in his retirement he had lived a serious life, associating much with
the Ulema, who, no doubt, pointed out to him the vacillating policy of
his predecessors, and the danger that there was that the Caliphate and
the empire would be lost together. He determined to strengthen his
empire by restoring the influence of the Caliphate, and rallying the
Mohammedan world once more around the throne of Othman. Judged from a
European standpoint, this policy is at once reactionary and suicidal. It
ignores the fact that the Ottoman empire is dependent for its ex