than before that he is really powerless to
defend any Mohammedan country against aggression. He could do nothing
for Tunis against France. He could do nothing for Arabi against England.
The very encouragement that he gave in these cases was an injury to
them. The Arabs are all ready to assert their rights to the Caliphate
and defend them against the Sultan. If he does not surrender the title
voluntarily, sooner or later they will take it by force, and that part
of the empire along with it.

The Sultan complains of the interference of Europe in the affairs of his
empire; but, in fact, he owes not only his throne, but his continued
possession of the Caliphate, to their protection. Let it be known in
Mecca to-day that Europe would favour such a change and encourage an
insurrection in Syria and Arabia, and the new Shereef of Mecca would
celebrate the Courban Beiram as Caliph amidst such enthusiasm as has not
been known there for a hundred years.

In spite of all this, however, in spite of the imperfection of his
title, and the coolness or discontent of Mohammedans throughout the
world, in spite of the growing weakness of the empire and his failure to
defend those whom he has encouraged to resist Europe, it is not probable
that Sultan Hamid will voluntarily surrender the Caliphate. Abd-ul-Aziz
might have done it to save his empire, but Sultan Hamid is too religious
a man; he values his title of Imam-ul-Mussilmin too highly to give it up
without a struggle. It is safe to conclude that he will cling to it
until it is taken by force by a stronger man.

I have already mentioned incidentally the relation of Europe to the
Caliphate. England and France are most directly interested in this
question, and hitherto their policy has been to sustain the claims of
the Sultans. They seem to be quite as anxious to maintain the Caliphate
of Constantinople as the Sultans themselves, and its continuance has
been due in great measure to their protection. As the interest of France
in this question is only secondary, I will confine myself to the policy
of England. It is not strange that England, with her Indian Empire and
40,000,000 Mohammedan subjects, should be deeply interested in the
question of the Caliphate. It must be a question of vital importance to
her whether it is better for the peace of India to have the Caliphate in
the hands of a temporal sovereign at Constantinople or of a Shereef of
Mecca in Arabia. So long as she was in close