period. Of this Great Britain stood ready to avail
herself, by extending to the United States the system of licenses, by
which, combined with the Orders in Council, she was combating with a
large degree of success Napoleon's Continental System. She hoped, and
the sequel showed not unreasonably, that even during open hostilities
she could in the same manner thwart the United States in its efforts
to keep its own produce from her markets. Less than a fortnight after
the American Declaration of War was received, Russell, who had not yet
left England, wrote to the Secretary of State that the Board of Trade
had given notice that licenses would be granted for American vessels
to carry provisions from the United States to Cadiz and Lisbon, for
the term of eight months; and that a policy had been issued at Lloyds
to a New York firm, insuring flour from that port to the peninsula,
warranted free from British capture, and from capture or detention by
the Government of the United States.[358]

The British armies were thus nourished and dependent, both in Spain
and in Canada. The supplying of the latter scarcely fell short of
treason, and decisively affected the maintenance of the war in that
quarter. It is difficult to demonstrate a moral distinction between
what was done there, disregardful of national success, in shameful
support of the enemy, and the supplying of the peninsula; but an
intuitive sympathy extends to the latter a tolerance which the motives
of the individual agents probably do not deserve, and for which calm
reason cannot give a perfectly satisfactory account. But it was the
misfortune of American policy, as shaped by the Administration, that
it was committed to support Napoleon in his iniquitous attack upon the
liberties of Spain; that it saw in his success the probable fulfilment
of its designs upon the Floridas;[359] and that its chosen ground for
proceeding against Great Britain, rather than France, was her refusal
to conform her action to a statement of the Emperor's, the illusory
and deceptive character of which became continually more apparent.

To declare war because of the Orders in Council was a simple,
straightforward, and wholly justifiable course; but the flying months
made more and more evident, to the Government and its agents abroad,
that it was vain to expect revocation on the ground of Napoleon's
recall of his edicts, for they were not recalled. Having entered upon
this course, however, it seem