much had been done to
strengthen the works; but pressed by the drain of the Peninsular War,
heaviest in the years 1809 to 1812, when France elsewhere was at
peace, little in the way of troops had been sent. As late as November
16, 1812, the Secretary for War, in London, notified Governor General
Prevost that as yet he could give no hopes of reinforcements.[409]
Napoleon had begun his retreat from Moscow three weeks before, but the
full effects of the impending disaster were not yet forecast. Another
three weeks, and the Secretary wrote that a moderate detachment would
be sent to Bermuda, to await there the opening of the St. Lawrence in
the spring.[410] But already the United States had lost Mackinac and
Detroit, and Canada had gained time to breathe.

Brock's remark, expanded as has here been done, defines the decisive
military points upon the long frontier from Lake Superior to Montreal.
Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, Montreal--these four places, together
with adequate development of naval strength on the lakes--constituted
the essential elements of the military situation at the opening of
hostilities. Why? Mackinac and Detroit because, being situated upon
extremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication,
their possession controlled decisively all transit. Held in force,
they commanded the one great and feasible access to the northwestern
country. Upon them turned, therefore, the movement of what was then
its chief industry, the fur trade; but more important still, the
tenure of those points so affected the interests of the Indians of
that region as to throw them necessarily on the side of the party in
possession. It is difficult for us to realize how heavily this
consideration weighed at that day with both nations, but especially
with the British; because, besides being locally the weaker, they knew
that under existing conditions in Europe--Napoleon still in the height
of his power, never yet vanquished, and about to undertake the
invasion of Russia--they had nothing to hope from the mother country.
Yet the leaders, largely professional soldiers, faced the situation
with soldierly instinct. "If we could destroy the American posts at
Detroit and Michilimackinac," wrote Lieutenant-Governor Gore of Upper
Canada, to Craig, in 1808, "many Indians would declare for us;" and he
agrees with Craig that, "if not for us, they will surely be against
us."[411]

It was Gore's successor, Brock, that wrested from th