at Britain to
search American vessels for British seamen; for it was the general
opinion with them that, if American seamen were encouraged, there
would be no need for the employment of foreign seamen."[280] Quincy
therefore condemned the retaliatory temper of the Administration, as
shown in the "Chesapeake" incident by the proclamation excluding
British ships of war, and in the embargo as a reply to the Orders in
Council. The oppression of American trade, culminating in the Orders,
was a just cause of war; but war was not expedient before a further
attempt at negotiation, favored by a withdrawal of all retaliatory
acts. He was willing to concede the exercise of British authority on
board American merchantmen on the high seas.

In the main these were the coincident opinions of Monroe, although a
Virginian and identified with the opposite party. At this time he
wrote to Jefferson privately, urging a special mission, for which he
offered his services. "Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the
next step to be taken, without an unexpected change, seems likely to
be the commencement of war with both France and Great Britain, unless
some expedient consistent with the honor of the Government and Country
is adopted to prevent it." To Jefferson's rejection of the proposition
he replied: "I have not the hope you seem still to entertain that our
differences with either Power will be accommodated under existing
arrangements. The embargo was not likely to accomplish the desired
effect, if it did not produce it under the first impression....
Without evidence of firm and strong union at home, nothing favorable
to us can be expected abroad, and from the symptoms in the Eastern
states there is much cause to fear that tranquillity cannot be secured
at present by adherence only to the measures which have heretofore
been pursued."[281] Monroe had already[282] expressed the opinion--not
to Jefferson, who had refused to ratify, but to a common
intimate--that had the treaty of December 31, 1806, signed by himself
and Pinkney, been accepted by the Administration, none of the
subsequent troubles with France and Great Britain would have ensued;
that not till the failure of accommodation with Great Britain became
known abroad was there placed upon the Berlin Decree that stricter
interpretation which elicited the Orders in Council, whence in due
sequence the embargo, the Eastern commotions, and the present alarming
outlook. In principle, Qui