ies, and their
national existence. Clearly navies, besides being very costly, were
fatal to constitutional freedom. Not in reply to such _non sequitur_,
but quickened by an insight which was to receive earlier vindication
than he could have anticipated, Quincy prophesied that, amid the
diverse and contrary interests of the several states, which the lack
of a common object of affection left still imperfectly unified in
sentiment, a glorious navy, identified with the whole country because
of its external action, yet local to no part, would supply a common
centre for the enthusiasm not yet inspired by the central government,
too closely associated for years back with a particular school of
extreme political thought, narrowly territorial and clannish in its
origin and manifestation. Within a twelvemonth, the "Constitution,"
most happily apt of all names ever given to a ship, became the
embodiment of this verified prediction.

The report of the committee was modest in its scope. "To the defence
of your ports and harbors, and the protection of your coasting trade,
should be confined the present objects and operations of any navy
which the United States can, or ought, to have." To this office it was
estimated that twelve ships of the line and twenty frigates would
suffice. Cheves and Lowndes were satisfied that such a fleet was
within the resources of the country; and to insure the fifteen
thousand seamen necessary to man it, they would be willing to limit
the number of privateers,--a most wholesome and necessary provision.
By a careful historical examination of Great Britain's past and
present exigencies, it was shown that such a force would most probably
keep clear the approaches to all American ports, the most critical
zone for shipping, whether inward or outward bound; because, to
counteract it, the enemy would have to employ numbers so largely
superior that they could not be spared from her European conflict. The
argument was sound; but unhappily Cheves, Lowndes, Clay, and Quincy
did not represent the spirit of the men who for ten years had ruled
the country and evolved the gunboat system. These, in their day of
power, not yet fully past, had neither maintained the fleet nor
accumulated material, and there was no seasoned timber to build with.
The Administration which expired in 1801 had left timber for six
74-gun ships, of which now remained only enough for four. The rest had
been wasted in gunboats, or otherwise. The c