at all these concessions were
to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not expect their fulfillment
until she had earned them by helping to defeat the Teutonic Powers.

Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-minded
statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of Greece,
concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as developed later,
in this he did not have the backing of the King and the rest of the
governing clique. In February no progress in the negotiations had
been made, though a special French Commission, headed by General
Pau, visited all the Balkan capitals and tried to bring about a
mutual agreement.

At about that time another important military event occurred, especially
affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente began bombarding
the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed that Constantinople was
presently to fall into their hands. Not long after Venizelos stated,
in an interview, that he was privy to this action and proposed to
send 50,000 Greek soldiers to assist the Allies by a land attack
on the Turks.

The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to support
Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible unless
Greece first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would not take
the opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall on the flank
of the Greek army operating against the Turks. Venizelos thereupon
approached Bulgaria and was told that Bulgaria would remain neutral
if Greece would cede most of her Macedonian conquests, which would
include Kavalla, Drama, and Serres, which stretch so provokingly
eastward along the coast and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.

Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught between
two obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one inch from
her demand; and, on the other hand, the Greek governing clique
suddenly refused to consider any proposal that would mean the cession
of any territory at all to the hated Bulgars. What probably stiffened
the opposition of the other members of the Greek Government to the
Turkish campaign was the growing suspicion on their part that the
Allies were also negotiating with Italy for her support. Now it
was obvious that if Italy was to fight in the Near East, she meant
to demand a good price. And this looked bad for Greece. Greece
and Italy had already nearly come to blows over their clashing
interests in southern Albania, yet even this was a small matter
compared t