elations. As
an aristocrat and a politician, he ranked among the first of the
empire. He had been foreign minister and later imperial chancellor.
But his chief qualification for the work was that, before returning
to Berlin for greater honors, he had been ambassador at Rome. He
had married a Sicilian lady, and was accustomed to spend part of
each year in Rome and on his wife's Sicilian estates. The prince
was a finished courtier and a charming host. At this juncture his
house in Rome became a center of neutralists, and Von Buelow began
overtures to Baron Sonnino, the new Italian Foreign Minister, to
discover what territorial concessions the Italian Government would
demand as recompense for the action of Austria and as the price
of adherence to the alliance.

It is remarkable that, throughout the critical period pending Italy's
decision, Italian statesmen negotiated mainly with German and not
Austrian diplomats. Although the Italians believed that Germany
had dictated Austria's war policy, in the end it developed that
the kaiser and his ministers were unable to control Austria to
the full extent that they considered desirable in the matter of
yielding to the Italian demands. The purpose of Prince von Buelow was
to find out the minimum terms acceptable to Italy, and meanwhile,
by making small concessions, create the impression that Italy could
gain without firing a shot all that she could hope for through
successful war. In fact, the Teutonic agents did bring against
the Italian Cabinet the accusation that they were not acting for
the best interests of their country, and were determined to fight
regardless of proffered concessions. This charge was denied by the
Italian premier in a speech wherein he asserted that the offers
of Germany were not in good faith.

Germany asked if the Italian claims would be satisfied by the cession
of Trentino. To this Baron Sonnino replied that he "did not consider
that Italian popular sentiment would be content with the Trentino
alone." A stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy, he
said, could be effected only by satisfaction of the old Irredentist
formula, "Trent and Trieste." Von Buelow answered that Austria certainly
would prefer war to the surrender of Trieste. Here the negotiations
stuck fast, the Italian ministry declining to define their demands
any further until Austria agreed to the cession of Italian territories
actually in the possession of the Hapsburg monarchy.