aking, what was impossible for him to avoid, the voluminous
business of the winding up. If such was the case in settling the
accounts of his predecessor, how much more has he to apprehend when the
accounts to be settled are his own? All men in bad circumstances
hate the settlement of accounts, and Pitt, as a Minister, is of that
description.

But let us take a view of things on a larger ground than the case of
a Minister. It will then be found, that England, on a comparison of
strength with France, when both nations are disposed to exert their
utmost, has no possible chance of success. The efforts that England made
within the last century were not generated on the ground of _natural
ability_, but of _artificial anticipations_. She ran posterity into
debt, and swallowed up in one generation the resources of several
generations yet to come, till the project can be pursued no longer. It
is otherwise in France. The vastness of her territory and her population
render the burden easy that would make a bankrupt of a country like
England.

It is not the weight of a thing, but the numbers who are to bear that
weight, that makes it feel light or heavy to the shoulders of those who
bear it. A land-tax of half as much in the pound as the land-tax is in
England, will raise nearly four times as much revenue in France as is
raised in England. This is a scale easily understood, by which all the
other sections of productive revenue can be measured. Judge then of the
difference of natural ability.

England is strong in a navy; but that navy costs about eight millions
sterling a-year, and is one of the causes that has hastened her
bankruptcy. The history of navy bills sufficiently proves this. But
strong as England is in this case, the fate of navies must finally be
decided by the natural ability of each country to carry its navy to the
greatest extent; and France is able to support a navy twice as large as
that of England, with less than half the expense per head on the people,
which the present navy of England costs.

We all know that a navy cannot be raised as expeditiously as an army.
But as the average duration of a navy, taking the decay of time, storms,
and all circumstances and accidents together, is less than twenty years,
every navy must be renewed within that time; and France at the end of a
few years, can create and support a navy of double the extent of that of
England; and the conduct of the English government will provo