to it in the way of legislation; and second, by unfriendly
legislation. If I rightly understand him, I wish to ask your attention
for a while to his position.

In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided
that any congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories is
unconstitutional: they have reached this proposition as a conclusion
from their former proposition that the Constitution of the United States
expressly recognizes property in slaves; and from that other
constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. Hence they reach the conclusion that as the
Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in
slaves, and prohibits any person from being deprived of property without
due process of law, to pass an act of Congress by which a man who owned
a slave on one side of a line would be deprived of him if he took him on
the other side, is depriving him of that property without due process of
law. That I understand to be the decision of the Supreme Court. I
understand also that Judge Douglas adheres most firmly to that decision;
and the difficulty is, how is it possible for any power to exclude
slavery from the Territory unless in violation of that decision? That is
the difficulty.

In the Senate of the United States, in 1856, Judge Trumbull in a speech,
substantially if not directly, put the same interrogatory to Judge
Douglas, as to whether the people of a Territory had the lawful power to
exclude slavery prior to the formation of a constitution? Judge Douglas
then answered at considerable length, and his answer will be found in
the "Congressional Globe," under date of June 9, 1856. The Judge said
that whether the people could exclude slavery prior to the formation of
a constitution or not, was a question to be decided by the Supreme
Court. He put that proposition, as will be seen by the "Congressional
Globe," in a variety of forms, all running to the same thing in
substance,--that it was a question for the Supreme Court. I maintain
that when he says, after the Supreme Court has decided the question,
that the people may yet exclude slavery by any means whatever, he does
virtually say that it is not a question for the Supreme Court. He shifts
his ground. I appeal to you whether he did not say it was a question for
the Supreme Court? Has not the Supreme Court decided that question? When
he now says that the people may exclu