xpressed an opinion upon it, that it is a
dangerous element. We keep up a controversy in regard to it. That
controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion, and if we
can learn exactly--can reduce to the lowest elements--what that
difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for
discussing the different systems of policy that we would propose in
regard to that disturbing element.

I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms,
is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a
wrong and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it
wrong--we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We think
it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the States
where it exists, but that it is a wrong which in its tendency, to say
the least, affects the existence of the whole nation. Because we think
it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a
wrong.

We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its
growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there
may be some promise of an end to it We have a due regard to the actual
presence of it amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in
any satisfactory way, and all the constitutional obligations thrown
about it. I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in
the nation, and to our constitutional obligations, we have no right at
all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that we
have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it.
We go further than that: we don't propose to disturb it where, in one
instance, we think the Constitution would permit us. We think the
Constitution would permit us to disturb it in the District of Columbia.
Still we do not propose to do that, unless it should be in terms which I
don't suppose the nation is very likely soon to agree to--the terms of
making the emancipation gradual and compensating the unwilling owners.
Where we suppose we have the constitutional right, we restrain ourselves
in reference to the actual existence of the institution and the
difficulties thrown about it. We also oppose it as an evil so far as it
seeks to spread itself. We insist on the policy that shall restrict it
to its present limits. We don't suppose that in doing this we violate
anything due to the actual presence of the institution, or anyth