es plus
grands changements que la Revolution y a faits, non-seulement sans
perdre sa couronne, mais en augmentant beaucoup son pouvoir.'--De
Tocqueville, _L'Ancien Regime_, p. 274.

CHAPTER III.

_DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN._

But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them
who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuit of
knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or
advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly
received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions
concerning the most important truths which they had hitherto held
sacred and unquestionable.--Berkeley's _Hylas and Philonous_.

In no department of science is it possible for an enquirer to advance
considerably beyond all his predecessors without serving as a light by
whose aid his successors may advance somewhat beyond him. This is the
only apology that I feel disposed to offer for the freedom with which I
am about to criticize one who, having been, by judges so competent as
Adam Smith and Professor Huxley, pronounced to be 'by far the greatest
philosopher' and 'acutest thinker' of his own age, would, doubtless, be
at least on a level with the greatest philosophers of the present age if
he were living now. The veriest cripple that can manage to sit on
horseback may contrive to crawl some few steps beyond the utmost point
to which his steed has borne him, and, if those steps be uphill, may, by
looking back on the course he has come, perceive where the animal has
deviated from the right road. Yet he does not on that account suppose
that his own locomotive power is in any respect to be compared to his
horse's; neither need an annotator on Hume, when pointing to holes in
his author's metaphysical coat, be supposed not to be perfectly aware
that it is the strength, not of his own eyes, but of the spectacles
furnished to him by his author, that enables him to perceive them.

The concentrated essence of Hume's metaphysics is to be found in 'An
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' forming part of a volume of
Essays which Hume published somewhat late in life, and which he desired
might 'alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and
principles.' To a formal, though necessarily rapid, examination of the
results of this 'Enquiry,' the present chapter will be almost
exclusively devoted. Often as the operation has been pe