though necessarily very greatly condensing it--I shall, I am
sure, be acknowledged to have conscientiously striven to do full
justice, by bringing all its points into the strongest light, and
arranging them in the most effective order. Still, with its utmost
strength thus displayed before us, we are fully warranted in asserting
_a priori_ that its whole utmost strength is weakness. If, by following
a leader who has engaged to conduct us to a certain spot, we find
ourselves at our journey's end in a quite different place, no appeal
that the guide can make to maps or finger-posts will persuade us that he
has not mistaken the way. Nor need our judgment be otherwise, even
though our guide be Hume, if, having started with him in pursuit of
truth, we are finally landed in a patent absurdity. With all due respect
for logic, we protest with Tony Lumpkin against being argufied out of
our senses, as we plainly should be if we allowed ourselves to be
persuaded that whenever we use the words _power_ or _connection_ we have
no idea thereto correspondent. Since, then, Hume tells us this, we may
be quite sure that he has been deluded by some fallacy which may be
detected by adequate search; and being, moreover, sensible that we
really have the idea our possession of which is denied by him, we may be
equally sure that the original of which the idea is a copy is similarly
discoverable. In sooth, neither the one nor the other is far to seek.
The fallacy consists simply in confusion of the definite with the
indefinite article. The original of our idea of power Hume himself
indicates even while rejecting it. Although constrained by Hume's
demonstration to confess that we cannot even conjecture of what kind is
_the_ authority which the will exercises over the limbs, we are not the
less sensible that it does exercise _an_ authority of some sort or
other, which they are unable to disobey. We know that in ordinary
circumstances our limbs will move when we wish them to move, and will
remain quiet when we wish them not to move. Nor this only. We moreover
know, or at any rate fancy we know, that they would not have moved
unless we had wished them. In examples like these of volitions followed,
as the case may be, by _premeditated_ motion or rest, we have something
more than the simple sequence observable in the succession of external
events. We do not perceive simply that, as when fire is lighted, heat is
emitted, so when the mind wills the body mov