nfessedly leading no whither, and bewildering
them with confessedly 'vain and profane babblings, and strivings after
words to no profit, but to subverting of the hearers, and overthrow of
the faith of some.' And it is as poor an excuse for this wanton
tampering with other people's creeds, as it is poor amends for its
mischievous consequences, that Hume offers when, after watching for a
while his puzzled disciples blown about by the winds of adverse doctrine
that he has let loose upon them, he proceeds to rally them on their
'whimsical condition,' which he speaks of as a mere laughing matter got
up chiefly for amusement. It is only an aggravation of offence that,
while, on the one hand, he solemnly pronounces everything to be 'a
riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery,' he, on the other hand,
cheerily exhorts us not to suffer the 'doubts raised by philosophy to
affect our actions.' 'Nature,' he says, 'is always too strong for
principles, will always maintain her rights, and prevail, in the end,
against all reasoning whatever.' 'The great subverter of Pyrrhonism,' he
continues, 'is actual employment and the occupations of common life,' in
presence of which its overstrained scruples 'vanish like smoke.'
Although real knowledge consists solely in knowing that we know nothing,
and in doubting everything, and although sceptics may 'justly triumph'
in principles which lead them to deny even the attraction of
gravitation, still they had better beware how they act on these
principles, lest by stepping unconcernedly out of window they come
fatally to grief on the stones below, and so the sect and its tenets be
annihilated together. So, or to such effect, Hume: but how can there be
just ground for pride in speculations which, as their own professors
admit, would, on the first attempt to reduce them to practice, be
shattered to pieces by hard facts? That cannot possibly, even on Hume's
recommendation, be accepted as metaphysical truth, which flatly
contradicts common sense, nor can there be any unbecoming
self-confidence in seeking, even though Hume pronounce the search
hopeless, for metaphysical truth, with which common sense may be
reconciled.

FOOTNOTES:

[29] Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. By James Mill. Edition
of 1869, with Notes by Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater, George Grote,
and John Stuart Mill, vol. i. pp. 78 _et seq._

[30] Mill's 'Logic.' 5th Edition. Vol. i. p. 377.

[31] 'There is a class of a