ers like alienating the native Christian Copts, whom
Mustapha Kamel had been careful to conciliate. The following diatribe
(which, by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and Eastern
ideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the increasing violence of his
propaganda: "The Copts should be kicked to death. They still have faces
and bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof that
they hide poisonous spirits within their souls. The fact that they exist
in the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generated
from monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You descendants of the
bearers of trays! You tails of camels with your monkey faces! You bones
of bodies!"

In this more violent attitude the nationalists were encouraged by
several reasons. For one thing, Lord Cromer had laid down his
proconsulate in 1907 and had been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new
ruler represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in power, which
wished to appease Egyptian unrest by conciliation instead of by Lord
Cromer's autocratic indifference. In the second place, the Young-Turk
revolution of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry for
constitutional self-government. Lastly, France's growing intimacy with
England dashed the nationalist's cherished hope that Britain would be
forced by outside pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and
evacuate the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely more on
their own exertions.

Given this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt was foredoomed to
failure. For, however conciliatory Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details,
he could not promise the one thing which the nationalists supremely
desired--independence. This demand England refused even to consider.
Practically all Englishmen had become convinced that Egypt with the Suez
Canal was a vital link between the eastern and western halves of the
British Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt was thus an absolute
necessity. There was thus a fundamental deadlock between British
imperial and Egyptian national convictions. Accordingly, the British
Liberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even Sir Eldon Gorst
admitted in his official reports that concessions were simply regarded
as signs of weakness.

Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence grew to such
proportions that the British Government became convinced that only
strong measures would save the situation. Therefore