sity to Islam even more than
a Caliph; and whoever is sovereign there is naturally sovereign of the
Mussulman world.
Outside Hejaz the Sultan holds what he holds of Arabia merely by force.
I have described already the growing power of Ibn Rashid, the Prince of
Nejd; and since that time, two years ago, he has sensibly extended and
confirmed his influence there. He has now brought into his alliance all
the important tribes of northern Arabia, including the powerful Ateybeh,
who, a few months ago, were threatening Mecca; and in Hejaz his name is
already as potent as the Sultan's. He offered, while I was at Jeddah, to
undertake the whole convoy of the Damascus pilgrimage with his own
troops, as already he convoys that from Persia; while I have quite
recent information of a campaign against his own rivals, the Ibn Saouds,
which he has just brought to a successful conclusion. In Yemen, the
other neighbour of the Meccans, 20,000 Turkish troops are required to
garrison the few towns the Sultan calls his own, and were it not for
the facility given him by the possession of the sea-coast, these could
not long hope to hold their ground. Every day I am expecting news from
there of a revolt, and the first sign of weakness at Constantinople will
certainly precipitate a war of independence in that part of Arabia.
We may expect, therefore, in the event of such a break-up as I have
suggested to be likely of the Ottoman power--either through loss of
territory or by the growing impoverishment of the empire, which needs
must, in a few decades, end in atrophy--to see among Mussulman princes a
competition for the right of protecting the Holy Places, and with it of
inheriting the Caliphal title. The Sultan reduced to Asia Minor, even if
he retain Armenia and Kurdistan (which is extremely improbable), would
be quite unable to afford himself the expensive luxury of holding his
Arabian conquests and buying the patronage of Mecca. He would be unable
any longer to overawe the Red Sea, or secure the pilgrim routes. The
Princes of Nejd would certainly not tolerate the presence of Turkish
soldiers at Medina, and the Sherifs of Mecca would have to make terms
with them and with the restored Imams of Yemen till such time as they
should find a new protector elsewhere. Above all, the half million of
Wakaf income would no longer be forthcoming, and a Turkish Emir el Haj
arriving empty-handed at Mecca would bring his master to a climax of
derision. Hejaz
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