ng of Italy, Commander of the dreadnought squadron of
the Italian Navy.
_(Photo (c) by Pach Bros., N.Y.)_]
[Illustration: H.M. FERDINAND I.
Tsar of the Bulgars.
_(Photo from P.S. Rogers.)_]
THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed
the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the
allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater
facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this
new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of
infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division
from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain.
In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the
intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided
at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to
have the British Army removed from the Aisne.
It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army
should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the
German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front
of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as
possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army.
But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not
possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only
cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north.
THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.
There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the
Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000
French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north
of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian
territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted
by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate
hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and
delayed their execution.
On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our
cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that,
in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was
not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous
few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort
was necessary. That effort was
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