es make excellent
section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic
company commanders in the field.
It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical
development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks,
above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic
spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and
even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on
Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of
our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the
spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to
those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their
fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements.
The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much
superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our
regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers,
fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each
regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are
regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by
Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the
army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is
declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young,
well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have
acquired the art of war by experience.
2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT.
Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the
front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The
infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the
companies have a strength of 250 or more.
In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are
all up to, or above, regulation strength.
This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French
Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new
units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her
available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has
avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has
only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with
certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future
requirements of the
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