een more correct to
have said that the southern section of the party had deserted in a body
and gone over to the Democratic party. National politics were thus left
in an entirely anomalous condition. The Democratic party was omnipotent
at the South, though it was afterward opposed feebly by the American
(or "Know Nothing ") organization, and was generally successful at
the North, though it was still met by the Northern Whigs with vigorous
opposition. Such a state of affairs was not calculated to satisfy
thinking men; and this period seems to have been one in which very
few thinking men of any party were at all satisfied with their party
positions.

This was the hazardous situation into which the Democratic managers
chose to thrust one of the most momentous pieces of legislation in our
political history-the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The responsibility for it is
clearly on the shoulders of Stephen A. Douglas. The over-land travel to
the Pacific coast had made it necessary to remove the Indian title to
Kansas and Nebraska, and to organize them as Territories, in order to
afford protection to emigrants; and Douglas, chairman of the Senate
committee on Territories, introduced a bill for such organization in
January, 1854. Both these prospective Territories had been made free
soil forever by the compromise of 1820; the question of slavery had been
settled, so far as they were concerned; but Douglas consented, after a
show of opposition, to reopen Pandora's box. His original bill did
not abrogate the Missouri compromise, and there seems to have been no
general Southern demand that it should do so. But Douglas had become
intoxicated by the unexpected success of his "popular sovereignty"
make-shift in regard to the Territories of 1850; and a notice of an
amendment to be offered by a southern senator, abrogating the Missouri
compromise, was threat or excuse sufficient to bring him to withdraw the
bill. A week later, it was re-introduced with the addition of "popular
sovereignty": all questions pertaining to slavery in these Territories,
and in the States to be formed from them, were to be left to the
decision of the people, through their representatives; and the Missouri
compromise of 1820 was declared "inoperative and void," as inconsistent
with the principles of the territorial legislation of 1850. It must
be remembered that the "non-intervention" of 1850 had been confessedly
based on no constitutional principle whatever, but was p