ary, but extends no further than to the property actually
possessed by the inhabitants of Missouri, when it was first occupied
by the United States. Property since acquired by them, and property
acquired or possessed by the new inhabitants of Missouri, has in each
case been acquired under the laws of the United States, and not during
and under the laws of the province of Louisiana. Should, therefore, the
future introduction of slaves into Missouri be forbidden, the feelings
of the citizens would soon become reconciled to their exclusion, and the
inconsiderable number of slaves owned by the inhabitants at the date
of the cession of Louisiana, would be emancipated or sent for sale into
States where slavery exists.

It is further objected, that the article of the act of admission into
the Union, by which slavery should be excluded from Missouri, would
be nugatory, as the new State in virtue of its sovereignty would be at
liberty to revoke its consent, and annul the article by which slavery is
excluded.

Such revocation would be contrary to the obligations of good faith,
which enjoins the observance of our engagements; it would be repugnant
to the principles on which government itself is founded; sovereignty in
every lawful government is a limited power, and can do only what it
is lawful to do. Sovereigns, like individuals, are bound by their
engagements, and have no moral power to break them. Treaties between
nations repose on this principle. If the new State can revoke and annul
an article concluded between itself and the United States, by which
slavery is excluded from it, it may revoke and annul any other article
of the compact; it may, for example, annul the article respecting public
lands, and in virtue of its sovereignty, assume the right to tax and to
sell the lands of the United States. There is yet a more satisfactory
answer to this objection. The judicial power of the United States is
co-extensive with their legislative power, and every question arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, is recognizable by
the judiciary thereof. Should the new State rescind any of the articles
of compact contained in the act of admission into the Union, that, for
example, by which slavery is excluded, and should pass a law authorizing
slavery, the judiciary of the United States on proper application, would
immediately deliver from bondage, any person retained as a slave in said
State. And, in like manner, in al