come to light since to set aside the severe
judgment pronounced upon this proceeding by the universal opinion
of contemporaries, including Lord John's own closest political
allies. That a Minister should run away from a hostile motion upon
affairs for which responsibility was collective, and this without a
word of consultation with a single colleague, is a transaction
happily without precedent in the history of modern English
Cabinets. [43]

[43] Morley's "Life of Gladstone," vol. i, p. 521. See also Lord Stanmore's
"Earl of Aberdeen," chap. X.

Mr. Herbert Paul, in his brilliant "History of Modern England," gives a
version of this occurrence, which, on the whole, is hardly less harsh
towards Lord John.

Well might Lord Palmerston complain of such behaviour as embarrassing. It
was crippling. It furnished the Opposition with unanswerable arguments.
"Here," they could say, "is the second man in your Cabinet, in his own
estimation the first, knowing all that you know, and he says 'that an
inquiry by the House is essential. How then can you deny or dispute it?'"
In a foot-note he adds, "Lord John offered to withdraw his resignation if
the Duke of Newcastle would retire [from the War Office] in favour of
Palmerston. It had been settled before Christmas between Lord Aberdeen and
the Duke that this change should be made. But no one else was aware of the
arrangement, and Lord Aberdeen, though he had assented to it, declined to
carry it out as the result of a bargain with Lord John."

Now both these versions leave out an important fact in the private history
of the Aberdeen Cabinet. Lord John had on two occasions at least,
subsequent to giving way upon the question of the Reform Bill, tried to
resign. Only the entreaties of the Queen and his colleagues had induced him
to remain in the Ministry; and then, it was understood, only until some
striking success of arms should make his resignation of less consequence to
them. But Sevastopol did not fall, and Lord John hung on, urging in the
meantime, emphatically and repeatedly, that the efficiency of the war
administration must be increased, that the control must be transferred from
the hands of the two Secretaries of War to the most vigorous Minister,
Palmerston. At the Cabinet meeting of December 6th, Lord John desisted from
pressing this particular change, owing to Palmerston having written to him
that he thought there were "no broad and distinct gro