States; in the south the
kingdom of Naples. Lord John, as the spokesman of England, by playing off
Napoleon, who was no friend to Italian unity, against Francis Joseph, who
was the prime enemy of Italian freedom, had secured for Italy an
opportunity to work out her own salvation. He and Cavour together had
forced Napoleon to prevent Austria from checking what Napoleon himself
would have liked to prevent.

Subsequently it came to light that Napoleon's surprising readiness in
agreeing to the annexation of Central Italy in April had been due to a
private arrangement between him and Cavour in the previous month. It was
agreed between them in March that Savoy and Nice should be handed over to
France as the price of her acquiescence. In the secret treaty of
Plombieres, Napoleon's reward for helping the Piedmontese, should the war
leave Venice, Lombardy, and the Romagna in Victor Emmanuel's hands, had
been fixed as the cession of these territories to France. But since
Napoleon had withdrawn and made peace when, as yet, only Lombardy had been
wrested from Austria, he had waived his claim upon Nice and Savoy at
Villafranca, and claimed in exchange a contribution towards his expenses in
the war. But the moment Piedmont proposed to annex Tuscany, the Romagna and
the Duchies, he returned to his original claim. His action had two
important results: one which immediately added to the complication of
Italian politics, and one which affected the diplomatic relations of the
Great Powers for the next eleven years. In Italy his demand made a lasting
breach between Cavour and Garibaldi. The latter never forgave the cession
of Nice, his native town, to France, and never could be convinced that the
sacrifice of Italian territory was a necessary step towards uniting Italy.
In his eyes the agreement with Napoleon had been a kind of treason on the
part of Cavour. Among the European Powers, on the other hand, Napoleon's
action created an impression, which was never effaced, that he was a
predatory and treacherous power.

In England the news was received with the greatest indignation. Lord John
was extremely angry, and practically threatened war. He, like Garibaldi,
did not realize that Cavour was driven to the concession, nor that Napoleon
was, in truth, compelled on his side to demand what he did. The following
letter from Sir James Hudson, the English Minister at Turin--"uomo
italianissimo," as Cavour called him--is particularly interesting, b