ny who to-day hold houses and lands were a
few years ago penniless.

As for the future, for many years the only answer possible to
tediously frequent inquiries as to what was going to happen in Morocco
has been that the future of the Shareefian Empire depended entirely
on what might happen in Europe, not to any degree on its own internal
condition. The only way in which this could affect the issue was by
affording an excuse for outside interference, as in the present case.

Corrupt as the native administration may be, it is but the expression
of a corrupt population, and no native government, even in Europe, is
ever far in advance of those over whom it rules. In spite, too, of the
pressure of injustice on the individual here and there, the victim of
to-day becomes the oppressor of to-morrow, and such opportunities
are not to be surrendered without a protest. The vast majority is,
therefore, always in favour of present conditions, and would rather
the chances of internecine strife than an exotic peace. No foreign
ruler, however benign, would be welcome, and no "penetration," however
"pacific," but will be endured and resented as a hostile wound. Even
the announcement of the Anglo-French Agreement was sufficient to
gravely accentuate the disorders of the country, and threaten
immediate complications with Europe, by provoking attacks on Europeans
who had hitherto been safe from interference save under exceptional
circumstances. A good deal of the present unrest is attributable to
this cause alone.

It is, therefore, a matter of deep regret that the one possible
remedy--joint action of the Powers in policing the Moors, as it were,
by demanding essential reforms in return for a united guarantee of
territorial integrity--was rendered impossible by the rivalries
between those Powers, especially on the part of France. Great
Britain's step aside has made possible the only alternative, the
surrender of the coveted task to one of their number, in return for
such _quid pro quo_ as each could obtain. Had the second-class
Powers been bargained with first, not only would they have secured
substantial terms, which now it is no use their asking, but the
leading Powers could have held out for terms yet undreamed of.

France did well to begin with Great Britain, but it was an egregious
diplomatic error to overlook Germany, which was thereby promoted to
the hitherto unhoped-for position of "next friend" and trusted adviser
of Morocco.