move
west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.
This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle
that had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord of
the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The next
morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but
little resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming
from the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans, however, had
put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of
this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. Word was soon
brought to me that our troops were in Iuka. I immediately rode into
town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.
I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on with
him a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I left
him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.
I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had so
high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.

CHAPTER XXIX.

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TENNESSEE.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to
reinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more on the
defensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at
Corinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.
Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar
became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad.
Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were
sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a country
where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and
friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. It was easy,
therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.
We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then
often returned without it.

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of Grand
Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and
artillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person to
superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be
made upo