side extending towards
Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles
above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the
same distance below. The land was so low and wet that it would not have
been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. I had had
this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if
there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the
plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. I had
intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. At dusk, when
concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed
his command on the west bank. The navy and transports ran the batteries
successfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our whole
fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving
down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with
National troops.

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that
we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a
landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a
good landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney,
from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some
twelve miles in the interior. The information was found correct, and
our landing was effected without opposition.

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the morning
of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up
the Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg
as I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the
river. The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned,
created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real
design. Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th,
with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had
left above Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack
the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff.
This move was made without a single casualty in either b