-quietism--agreed with the oldest popular ideal of divine existence.
In this way Epicureanism became the most orthodox of all Greek
philosophical schools. If nevertheless Epicurus did not escape the charge
of atheism the sole reason is that his whole theology was denounced
off-hand as hypocrisy. It was assumed to be set up by him only to shield
himself against a charge of impiety, not to be his actual belief. This
accusation is now universally acknowledged to be unjustified, and the
Epicureans had no difficulty in rebutting it with interest. They took
special delight in pointing out that the theology of the other schools was
much more remote from popular belief than theirs, nay, in spite of
recognition of the existing religion, was in truth fundamentally at
variance with it. But in reality their own was in no better case: gods who
did not trouble in the least about human affairs were beings for whom
popular belief had no use. It made no difference that Epicurus's
definition of the nature of the gods was the direct outcome of a
fundamental doctrine of popular belief. Popular religion will not tolerate
pedantry.
In this connexion we cannot well pass over a third philosophical school
which played no inconspicuous role in the latter half of our period,
namely, Scepticism. The Sceptic philosophy as such dates from Socrates,
from whom the so-called Megarian school took its origin, but it did not
reach its greatest importance until the second century, when the Academic
school became Sceptic. It was especially the famous philosopher Carneades,
a brilliant master of logic and dialectic, who made a success by his
searching negative criticism of the doctrines of the other philosophical
schools (the Dogmatics). For such criticism the theology of the
philosophers was a grateful subject, and Carneades did not spare it. Here
as in all the investigations of the Sceptics the theoretical result was
that no scientific certainty could be attained: it was equally wrong to
assert or to deny the existence of the gods. But in practice the attitude
of the Sceptics was quite different. Just as they behaved like other
people, acting upon their immediate impressions and experience, though
they did not believe that anything could be scientifically proved, _e.g._
not even the reality of the world of the senses, so also did they
acknowledge the existing cult and lived generally like good heathens.
Characteristic though Scepticism be of a period of Gr
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