works where he expresses his own ideals, it is philosophy that is
predominant and the official religion ignored. Virgil was an Epicurean;
Horace an Eclectic, now an Epicurean, then a Stoic; Augustus had a
domestic philosopher. Ovid employed his genius in writing travesties of
the old mythology while at the same time he composed a poem, serious for
him, on the Roman cult; and when disaster befell him and he was cast out
from the society of the capital, which was the breath of life to him, he
was abandoned not only by men, but also by the gods--he had not even a
philosophy with which to console himself. It is only in inferior writers
such as Valerius Maximus, who wrote a work on great deeds--good and
evil--under Tiberius, that we find a different spirit.
Direct utterances about men's relationship to the gods, from which
conclusions can be drawn, are seldom met with during this period. The
whole question was so remote from the thoughts of these people that they
never mentioned it except when they assumed an orthodox air for political
or aesthetic reasons. Still, here and there we come across something. One
of the most significant pronouncements is that of Pliny the Elder, from
whom we quoted the passage about the worship of Fortune. Pliny opens his
scientific encyclopedia by explaining the structure of the universe in its
broad features; this he does on the lines of the physics of the Stoics,
hence he designates the universe as God. Next comes a survey of special
theology. It is introduced as follows: "I therefore deem it a sign of
human weakness to ask about the shape and form of God. Whoever God is, if
any other god (than the universe) exists at all, and in whatever part of
the world he is, he is all perception, all sight, all hearing, all soul,
all reason, all self." The popular notions of the gods are then reviewed,
in the most supercilious tone, and their absurdities pointed out. A polite
bow is made to the worship of the Emperors and its motives, the rest is
little but persiflage. Not even Providence, which was recognised by the
Stoics, is acknowledged by Pliny. The conclusion is like the beginning:
"To imperfect human nature it is a special consolation that God also is
not omnipotent (he can neither put himself to death, even if he would,
though he has given man that power and it is his choicest gift in this
punishment which is life; nor can he give immortality to mortals or call
the dead to life; nor can he bring it
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