or that the phenomena which supply that evidence may
be as well, or more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail,
in like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth that,
even on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume or to act upon
the assumption, that _there is no God_, since the result of his
reasonings is _doubt_ merely, and such doubt as implies that there _may
be_ a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he will probably defer to it so far
as to admit that this is the only logical result of his system, but will
add that, where there is no conclusive evidence on either side, there
can be no moral obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living
"without God in the world." It will be found, too, that, distinct as
these two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they have
often been made to rest on a common ground, and the self-same arguments
have been adduced in support of both. Thus the doctrine of Materialism,
the theory of Development, and the system of Natural Laws, have all been
applied by the Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence
and government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of Nature
may be accounted for without the supposition of a Supreme Mind; while
the very same doctrines or theories have been also applied by the
Skeptical Atheist to justify, not his _denial_, but his _doubt_, and to
vindicate his verdict of "_non-liquet_" on the evidence adduced. And as
the same arguments are often employed by both parties in support of
their respective views, so they make use, for the most part, of the
same objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it would
be impossible, and even were it possible it would be superfluous, to
attempt a formal refutation of either, without discussing those more
general principles which are applicable to both. For this reason, we
propose to examine in the sequel the various theories which have been
applied in support alike of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to
illustrate the grounds that are common to both, while we consider also
the distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particularly
the grounds of Religious Skepticism.

Besides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism,
we must consider the difference between _the four great leading systems_
which have been applied to account for the existing order of Nature,
without the recognition of a living, int