ct the morals and
welfare of mankind.

The question has been raised whether Atheism might not be more conducive
than religion to _the personal happiness of individuals_; and some, who
have confounded Religion with Superstition, have not hesitated to answer
that question in the affirmative. The conviction that there is no God,
and no moral government, and no state of future retribution, could it
only be steadfastly and invariably maintained, might serve, it has been
thought, to relieve the mind of many forebodings and fears which disturb
its peace, and, if it could not ensure perfect happiness, might act at
least as an opiate or sedative to a restless and uneasy conscience. In
the opinion of Epicurus and Lucretius, tranquillity of mind was the
grand practical benefit of that unbelief which they sought to inculcate
respecting the doctrine of Providence and Immortality. They frequently
affirmed that _fear_ generated superstition, and that superstition, in
its turn, deepened and perpetuated the fear from which it sprung; that
the minds of men must necessarily be overcast with anxiety and gloom as
long as they continued to believe in a moral government and a future
state; and that the only sovereign and effectual antidote to
superstitious terror is the spirit of philosophical unbelief. Similar
views are perpetually repeated in the eloquent but declamatory pages of
"The System of Nature." But the remedy proposed seems to be subject to
grave suspicion, as one that may be utterly powerless, or at the best,
exceedingly precarious; for, first of all, the fears which are supposed
to have generated Religion must have been anterior to it, and must have
arisen from some natural cause, which will continue to operate even
after Religion has been disowned. They spring, in fact, necessarily out
of our present condition as dependent, responsible, and dying creatures;
and they can neither be prevented nor cured by the mere negations of
Atheism; we can only be raised above their depressing influence by a
rational belief and well-grounded trust in the being and character of
God. Again, if the denial of a Providence and of a future state might
serve, were it associated with a full assurance of certainty, to relieve
us from _the fear_ of retribution hereafter, it must equally destroy
_all hope_ of immortality, and reduce us to the dreary prospect of
annihilation at death,--a prospect from which the soul of man
instinctively recoils, and by whi