human knowledge. In each of these
forms, Atheism is dogmatic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies
the possibility of His being known. But there is also a _skeptical_
Atheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is no God,
or that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded by the limitations of
human reason, but contents itself with saying, "_non-liquet_,"--_i.e._,
with denying the sufficiency of the evidence. It answers every appeal to
that evidence by saying that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds
of some, it does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for
this reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. These
two forms of Atheism--the Dogmatic and the Skeptical--are widely different
from each other; they rest on distinct grounds, and they require, therefore,
to be discussed separately, each on its own peculiar and independent merits.
The Dogmatic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed
merely against his skeptical ally; for, strong in his own position and
confident in his ability to maintain it, he is conscious of no
speculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly believes.
The Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the arguments which are
directed against a Dogmatic System such as he utterly disclaims; he is
equally unwilling to affirm either that there is, or that there is not,
a God: he takes refuge in doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny;
his only plea is, the want or the weakness of evidence on either side.
From this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative
Atheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them on its own
merits; and yet, although theoretically they may be easily
distinguished, it will be found that practically they are often
conjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate between the two, and
shift its ground by betaking itself alternately to the one or the
other, according to the exigencies of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic
Atheist with the unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would
require nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God,
and he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he cannot prove
his negative conclusion, but will add that he is not bound to do so, and
that all that can be reasonably required of him is to show that the
evidence adduced on the opposite side is insufficient to establish the
Divine existence,