deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some
dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to
retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore
there can be sedition without mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary
to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the
word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly
of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and
for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which
sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it
follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common
good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its
gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it
assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the
common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves
seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because
he defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common
good, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the
common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:
and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity
of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

Reply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is
directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather
that